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Abstract. Whether return synchronicity is associated with higher or lower stock price 
informativeness is still an ongoing debate in the academic literature. This paper contributes 
to this debate by exploiting an exogenous shock, provided by a regulatory change 
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using a sample of U.S. listed bank holding companies (BHCs) operating during the period of 
2014: Q3 – 2016: Q2. Applying a regression discontinuity design, we find that return 
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that lower return synchronicity represents lower stock price informativeness. 
 
JEL Classifications: G14, G21, G28 
Keywords: Price Informativeness; Stock Return Synchronicity; Financial Regulation; Bank 
Opacity 
 
Acknowledgement: This paper was presented at the 2019 Cross Country Perspectives of Finance 
(CCPF) conferences held in Jinan, China and Mauritius. We would like to thank Sheng Zhao, seminar 
participants of the CCPF conferences and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. 







                                                          
1 Corresponding author.  





Banks are inherently more opaque than companies in other industries (Morgan, 2002; 
Blau, Brough and Griffith, 2017). Existing empirical research has shown that it is difficult for 
outsiders to valuate banks (Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2012; Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran, 
2013). As a consequence, market discipline presumes to be less effective for banks (Morgan 
and Stiroh, 2001).  
Stock price informativeness is a key concept to better understand the role played by 
market discipline. The most famous measure of stock price informativeness in literature is 
stock return synchronicity, which is the co-movement of an individual stock return with the 
market (e.g., Gul, Kim and Qiu, 2010; An and Zhang, 2013; Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2013). 
However, whether higher return synchronicity is associated with higher or lower 
informativeness has been a subject of debate in recent years (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; 
Dasgupta, Gan and Gao, 2010; Xing and Anderson, 2011).  
The first theory argues that lower synchronicity represents higher stock price 
informativeness. Roll (1988) suggests that low stock price synchronicity could be caused by 
either the incorporation of private information or occasional frenzy (i.e., noise). Inspired by 
Roll’s work, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Durnev et al. (2003) find that stocks have lower 
return synchronicity because more firm-specific information is incorporated into stock 
prices thanks to active informed arbitrageurs. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Jin and 
Myers (2006) further find that more difficulties in understanding a firm (e.g., higher opacity) 
could discourage informed trading by increasing the cost of informed arbitrage, and 
consequently, prevent the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices. Based 
on the findings, they conclude that price synchronicity is higher when firms are more 
difficult to be understood, and stock prices are less informative. 
However, the second theory advocates a positive relationship between synchronicity 
and stock price informativeness. Dasgupta, Gan and Gao (2010) propose a theoretical model 
predicting that price synchronicity increases when a firm is less opaque. They explain that 
lower opacity can accelerate the incorporation of firm-specific information and reduce 
idiosyncratic variation. Chan and Chan (2014) find a negative relationship between return 
synchronicity and the discount of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Given that SEO discount 
is lower when investors face less information asymmetry, they conclude that higher 
synchronicity indicates higher informativeness.  
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We examine whether more opaque banks have lower or higher stock return 
synchronicity. Banks are usually excluded from the empirical research discussing the 
relationship between synchronicity and informativeness, because banks are different from 
non-financial firms in many aspects. However, opacity is more compelling and prevalent in 
the banking industry and regulations attempt to improve the disclosure quality to alleviate 
information asymmetry in banking industry (Akhigbe and Martin, 2006; Jirasakuldech et al., 
2011). Therefore, we argue that the banking industry and regulatory change that targets 
information disclosure is an ideal setting for investigating this debate. 
To reduce the regulatory burden for small banks, the Fed issued a new Small Bank 
Holding Company (BHC) Policy Statement in May 2015. With this regulation, the asset 
threshold for identifying small BHCs was increased from $500 million to $1 billion. Newly 
qualified small BHCs can enjoy relatively loose capital and regulatory reporting 
requirements (The Federal Reserve, 2015). In this paper, we test whether this regulatory 
change could affect bank synchronicity using a sample of U.S. listed BHCs operating during 
the period of 2014: Q3 – 2016: Q2. As robustness checks, we use the illiquidity ratio of 
Amihud (2002) as an alternative trade-based measures of price impact (Kyle, 1985). We find 
that the synchronicity of treated BHCs is significantly lower than control BHCs after the 
implementation of the 2015 policy statement, and the illiquidity ratio of treated banks is 
significantly lower than control BHCs.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature. To the best of our knowledge, we test 
the relationship between stock price synchronicity and informativeness for the first time in 
the banking industry. Most previous studies examined samples including only non-financial 
firms (e.g., Dasgupta, Gan and Gao, 2010; Kelly, 2014; Chan and Chan, 2014). Our findings 
provide further evidence in support of a positive relationship between return synchronicity 
and price informativeness. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our hypothesis. Section 
3 presents the methodology and econometric specifications. Section 4 discusses the data 






Stock prices and information flows have symbiotic relationship and are inseparable in 
financial markets. An informative stock price is expected to reflect fundamental value and 
firm-specific information of the company (Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2012; Flannery, Kwan and 
Nimalendran, 2013). Stock price informativeness is usually measured by stock return 
synchronicity, however, there is no consensus to date about whether higher return 
synchronicity is associated with higher or lower informativeness (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; 
Dasgupta, Gan and Gao, 2010). One theory supports the negative relationship between 
synchronicity and informativeness (e.g., Roll, 1988; Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000; Durnev et 
al., 2003; Banerjee, Davis and Gondhi, 2018), while the other theory predicts the positive 
relationship (e.g., Dasgupta, Gan and Gao, 2010; Chan, Hameed and Kang, 2013; Chan and 
Chan, 2014; Kan and Gong, 2018; Watanabe, Imhof and Tartaroglu, 2019). Both theories are 
supported empirically. However, banks are excluded from previous studies. 
To examine the relationship between synchronicity and informativeness, we test the 
impact of the 2015 Small BHC Policy Statement on synchronicity. If higher return 
synchronicity implies higher (lower) price informativeness, then return synchronicity and 
bank opacity are negatively (positively) related. This implies that stock return synchronicity 
of treated banks decreases (increases) after the introduction of the 2015 policy statement. 
This leads to our hypothesis, stated in its alternative form: 
 
H1: The introduction of the 2015 Small BHC Policy Statement decreases (or 
increases) stock return synchronicity of treated banks. 
 
3. Methodology and Econometric Specifications 
3.1. Institutional Background 
Drawing lessons from the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the Fed strengthened the 
supervision on the banking sector. However, concerns about the potential impacts of post-
Dodd-Frank rules and regulations have been arisen in recent years, particularly for small 
banks (Conference of State Bank Supervisors and Federal Reserve, 2013 and 2017). To 
relieve regulatory burden for small banks, a new Small Bank Holding Company (BHC) Policy 
Statement was signed into Public Law 113-250 in December 2014 (The Congress, 2014) and 
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was effective in May 2015 (The Federal Reserve, 2015)2. With this new regulatory change, 
the asset threshold for identifying small BHCs increased from $500 million (valid from 2006) 
to $1 billion. Newly classified small BHCs are exempt from strict capital and reporting 
requirements. 
The BHCs newly classified as small BHCs are exempt from risk-based and leverage 
capital rules under Basel III, although their affiliated banks are still subjected to the Basel III 
capital requirements. In addition to the less restrict capital requirement, small BHCs under 
the Policy Statement enjoy the reduced form of reporting requirement. Medium and large 
BHCs are required to submit FR Y-9C report quarterly and FR Y-9LP semi-annually. With a 
length of 60 pages, FR Y-9C is a regulatory report covering financial data of parent 
companies and their subsidiaries. FR Y-9LP is a parent only regulatory report with a length of 
9 pages. However, the qualifying small BHCs are only required to submit FR Y-9SP report 
semi-annually. FR Y-9SP is an 8-page parent company only financial statement and contains 
less information than FR Y-9C.  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
We follow Dechezleprêtre et al., (2016) and use a simple reduced-form regression 
discontinuity (RD)3 equation of the form:  
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼1,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,2014 + 𝑓1,𝑡(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,2014) + 𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
                                                          
2
 The Policy Statement has been revised three times since 1980. The asset threshold to identify small BHCs was 
initially set to $150 million in 1980. It was increased to $500 million in 2006 to address the effects of inflation, 
bank safety and soundness, and normal asset growth of BHCs (The Federal Reserve, 2006). In 2015, the asset 
limit was raised to $1 billion, and all saving and loan holding companies (SLHCs) with total assets less than $1 
billion had been covered by the Policy Statement since then (The Federal Reserve, 2015). The most recent 
adjustment was in 2018. In the spirit of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(EGRRCPA), the Fed increased the asset threshold to $3 billion to further reduce regulatory burden (The 
Federal Reserve, 2018).  
3
 The RD design is valid when banks or their parent companies cannot “precisely manipulate” the running 
variable (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The newly qualifying small BHCs (i.e., those 
becoming small BHCs only under the new asset threshold) could only get benefits from the regulatory change 
after May 2015 (The Federal Reserve, 2015). However, the capital and reporting exemptions were based on 
the BHC assets in June 2014, and the Fed first announced the change of asset threshold in December 2014 
(The Congress, 2014). That prevented banks’ strategic behaviour around the new threshold. Hence, 2015Q3 
and afterwards are treated as full policy-on periods. Meanwhile, the small BHC status of a BHC in 2015Q3 and 
afterwards was based on its financial and operational status in 2014Q2. Using assets in 2014Q2 as the primary 
running variable could mitigate the concern that there might be endogenous sorting of the affiliated banks 
across the threshold. An RD design assumes that the distribution of all predetermined variables should not 
change discontinuously around the threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), therefore, eligibility of small BHC status 
is as good as randomly assigned it at the cut-off point. 
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Where i and t subscripts represent individual BHC and time, respectively. 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is a 
measure of stock price informativeness. We use polynomials of the running variable, parent-
BHC asset in 2014Q2 𝑓1,𝑡(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,2014), which can be fallen on either side of the new asset 
threshold (𝑆𝑖𝑧?̃?). 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,2014 is a binary dummy taking the value of one if 2014Q2 
assets of the parent company of bank i are less than or equal to the asset threshold ($1 
billion), and zero otherwise, and it represents the eligibility of the bank i’s parent company 
for the Small BHC Policy Statement. The coefficient 𝛼2 captures the effect of being below 
the asset threshold on price informativeness. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables which are the 
determinates of synchronicity highlighted in the literature, and 𝜀1𝑖,𝑡  is an error term. 
Standard errors are clustered at the BHC level.  
Based on equation (1), we estimate regressions for quarter-by-quarter outcomes. 
Following Dechezleprêtre et al., (2016), we also run analogous regressions in the pre-policy 
quarters to assess the validity of the RD design. 
 
3.3 Measures of Stock Price Informativeness 
3.3.1 Stock Return Synchronicity 
Stock price synchronicity is measured as the logit transformation of the R-squared 
statistic from a regression of individual stock return on market return. It is measured for 
each bank-quarter in the sample. Following the method proposed by Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000), we regress banks’ daily returns on daily market returns as follows: 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2) 
where 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 is the day t value-weighted return on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, and 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 is 
the daily stock return of bank i.  
We run regressions for each bank on a quarterly basis and obtain R-squared statistics 
(𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ) from each estimation. The stock price synchronicity for bank i in quarter t then can be 
calculated as the log ratio of explained return variance to unexplained return variance: 
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝑖𝑡 = ln [𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 /(1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 )]         (3) 
 
3.3.2 Stock Illiquidity 
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As robustness checks, we use the illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002)4 as an alternative 
measure of price informativeness (Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo, 2011; Fresard, 2012). The 
illiquidity ratio (Illiq) is the average of the daily stock’s absolute return and its dollar volume 









,        (4) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the number of trading days for bank i with valid observations in quarter 𝑡,      
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝜏 is the daily stock return, and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝐷𝑖𝜏 is the dollar volume of bank i on day 𝜏.  
 
3.4 Control Variables 
We first control for bank size (Sizeit) which is measured as the logarithm of bank assets 
(Hughes, Mester and Moon, 2001). The loan to asset ratio (LoanToAssetit) is included 
because it is difficult for outsiders to value the banks’ assets, especially loans (Flannery, 
Kwan and Nimalendran, 2004; Francis et al., 2015). Bank capitalisation is controlled by the 
ratio of equity to assets (EquityRatioit). A better capitalised bank receives more monitoring 
from shareholders, and they suffer less from moral hazard problems (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997). Following Thomas (2002) and Bai et al. (2017), we use the market-to-book ratio MTBit 
to control for a bank’s growth opportunities, since banks with better growth opportunities 
could reveal more firm-specific information. Non-performing loans (NPLit) are regarded as 
bank-specific signals of information asymmetry the banking literature (Sarkisyan et al., 2009; 
Jones, Lee and Yeager, 2013). The return on asset (ROAit) is included to control for 
profitability (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006).  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of U.S. listed BHCs operating during 
the period 2014: Q3 – 2016: Q2. Banks’ quarterly financial data and daily market data are 
extracted from S&P Global Market Intelligence. Daily market returns are calculated based 
                                                          
4
 Stock prices are assumed to efficiently aggregate information from various market participants and hence 
improve the allocation of resources (Hayek, 1945). The aggregation of information is enabled by the trading 
activity of diverse speculators who incorporate their private information into market prices via their trades 
(Kyle, 1985). As in Kyle (1985) and Fresard (2012), the degree to which the price is affected should be positively 
related to the perceived amount of informed trading on a stock. Therefore, the illiquidity ratio is positively 
related to the amount of private information incorporated into stock prices (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008; 
Fresard, 2012). Thus, higher illiquidity ratio indicates higher stock price informativeness. 
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on the daily market risk premium from Kenneth R. French’s Website5. There are 229 BHCs 
and 2,971 quarter-BHC observations in the final sample6. 
Table 1B displays the descriptive statistics of bank-level data for the whole sample. The 
average stock return synchronicity is -3.99, while the average illiquidity ratio is 0.02. 
Compared to stock return synchronicity, the illiquidity ratio shows a lower variation. In 
addition, the mean book value of assets is $1.01 billion, while the maximum of total assets is 
$2.00 billion. On average, the loan-to-asset ratio is 69%, and the equity-to-asset ratio is 11%. 
The average ratio of non-performing loans to total assets is 2%. The correlations among all 
independent variables are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix. All correlation coefficients 
are at an acceptable level suggesting that there is no multicollinearity problem in our 
regressions. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Based on Eq. (1), we examined the impact of the 2015 Small BHC Policy Statement on 
stock return synchronicity using regression discontinuity (RD) design. Treatmenti,2014 is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the parent BHCs’ total assets are below $1 billion in 
2014:Q2. The running variable is the total assets of BHCs in 2014:Q2. Fig. 1 displays the 
visible discontinuity in stock return synchronicity at the asset threshold. There is clear 
evidence of a sudden decrease in stock return synchronicity for treated BHCs at the 
threshold showing the effect of the regulatory change. 
Regression results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1–4 show the results for four pre-
policy quarters. There is no significant discontinuity in synchronicity at the asset threshold, 
indicating that there is no pre-policy trend. The coefficients in columns 5 and 6 are negative 
and significant. This implies that BHCs whose total assets are below the threshold had 
significantly lower stock return synchronicity than BHCs whose total assets are above the 
threshold. This finding suggests a positive relationship between informativeness and 
synchronicity. 




 We exclude several banks based on exclusion criteria applied by the existing literature (Jones, Lee and 
Yeager, 2013; Fosu et al., 2018). First, we remove banks operating less than three consecutive quarters. 
Second, we exclude banks with available daily observations fewer than 26 in one quarter when calculating 
return synchronicity. Finally, considering the comparability of the treated group and control group, BHCs with 
total consolidated assets more than $2 billion are excluded. Following Jones, Lee and Yeager (2013) and Fosu 
et al. (2018), all balance sheet items are presented as end-of-quarter amounts. All quarterly data are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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As robustness checks, we use the illiquidity ratio (Illiq) of Amihud (2002) as an 
alternative trade-based measure of price informativeness. .Columns 2 to 4 of Table 4 show 
no significant discontinuity in Illiq at the asset threshold in the pre-policy period. However, 
the coefficients in columns 5 to 7 are negative and significant, indicating a significant 
decrease in Illiq in the post-policy period. Overall, we find that more opaque BHCs, those 
with total assets below the threshold, had significantly lower stock return synchronicity and 
Illiq in the post-policy period. This finding implies a positive relationship between price 
informativeness and return synchronicity. 
  
6. Conclusion 
Whether return synchronicity is associated with higher or lower stock price 
informativeness is still an ongoing debate in the academic literature. In this paper, we 
explore this relationship in the banking industry. In particular, we examine the link between 
bank opacity and stock return synchronicity. A positive (negative) link between bank opacity 
and return synchronicity would support a negative (positive) relationship between return 
synchronicity and informativeness. 
We exploit an exogenous shock provided by a regulatory change. The 2015 Small BHC 
Policy Statement reduces regulatory burden for small banks by decreasing the quantity and 
quality of regulatory reporting. We test whether the policy affects stock return synchronicity 
using a regression discontinuity design.  
We find that stock return synchronicity of the treated BHCs decreases after the 
implementation of the 2015 Small BHC Policy Statement. This finding suggests that lower 
return synchronicity represents lower stock price informativeness. Our results have 
important implications for policy makers. Although this regulation helps reduce regulatory 







Akhigbe, A. and Martin, A.D., 2006. Valuation impact of Sarbanes-Oxley: Evidence from 
disclosure and governance within the financial services industry. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 30(3), pp.989–1006. 
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal 
of Financial Markets, 5(1), pp.31–56. 
An, H. and Zhang, T., 2013. Stock price synchronicity, crash risk, and institutional investors. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 21(1), pp.1–15. 
Bai, X., Hu, N., Liu, L. and Zhu, L., 2017. Credit derivatives and stock return synchronicity. 
Journal of Financial Stability, 28, pp.79–90. 
Banerjee, S., Davis, J. and Gondhi, N., 2018. When transparency improves, must prices 
reflect fundamentals better? Review of Financial Studies, 31(6), pp.2377–2414. 
Berger, A.N. and DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 21(6), pp.849–870. 
Blau, B.M., Brough, T.J. and Griffith, T.G., 2017. Bank opacity and the efficiency of stock 
prices. Journal of Banking and Finance, 76, pp.32–47. 
Chan, K. and Chan, Y.C., 2014. Price informativeness and stock return synchronicity: 
Evidence from the pricing of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 
114(1), pp.36–53. 
Chan, K., Hameed, A. and Kang, W., 2013. Stock price synchronicity and liquidity. Journal of 
Financial Markets, 16(3), pp.414–438. 
Dasgupta, S., Gan, J. and Gao, N., 2010. Transparency, price informativeness, and stock 
return synchronicity: Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 45(5), pp.1189–1220. 
Dechezleprêtre, A., Einiö, E., Martin, R., Nguyen, K-T., Van Reenen, J., 2016. Do tax 
incentives for research increase firm innovation ?An RD Design for R&D. NBER Working 
Paper No. 22405. 
Durnev, A., Morck, R., Yeung, B. and Zarowin, P., 2003. Does Greater Firm-Specific Return 
Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing? Journal of Accounting Research, 
41(5), pp.797–836. 
Fernandes, N. and Ferreira, M.A., 2008. Does international cross-listing improve the 
information environment. Journal of Financial Economics. 
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M.A. and Raposo, C.C., 2011. Board structure and price 
informativeness. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(3), pp.523–545. 
Flannery, M.J., Kwan, S.H. and Nimalendran, M., 2004. Market evidence on the opaqueness 
of banking firms’ assets. Journal of Financial Economics, 71(3), pp.419–460. 
Flannery, M.J., Kwan, S.H. and Nimalendran, M., 2013. The 2007-2009 financial crisis and 
bank opaqueness. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(1), pp.55–84. 
Fosu, S., Danso, A., Agyei-Boapeah, H., Ntim, C.G. and Murinde, V., 2018. How does banking 
market power affect bank opacity? Evidence from analysts’ forecasts. International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 60(May), pp.38–52. 
Francis, B.B., Hasan, I., Song, L. and Yeung, B., 2015. What determines bank-specific 
variations in bank stock returns? Global evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
24(3), pp.312–324. 




Gul, F.A., Kim, J.B. and Qiu, A.A., 2010. Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit 
quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 95(3), pp.425–442. 
Hayek, F., 1945. The use of knowledge in society. In: The American Economic Review. 
Cambridge: American Economic Association, pp.519–530. 
Hughes, J.P., Mester, L.J. and Moon, C.G., 2001. Are scale economies in banking elusive or 
illusive?: Evidence obtained by incorporating capital structure and risk-taking into 
models of bank production. Journal of Banking and Finance. 
Imbens, G.W. and Lemieux, T., 2008. Regression discontinuity designs : A guide to practice. 
Journal of Econometrics, 142, pp.615–635. 
Jin, L. and Myers, S.C., 2006. R2around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 79(2), pp.257–292. 
Jirasakuldech, B., Dudney, D.M., Zorn, T.S. and Geppert, J.M., 2011. Financial disclosure, 
investor protection and stock market behavior: An international comparison. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 37(2), pp.181–205. 
Jones, J.S., Lee, W.Y. and Yeager, T.J., 2012. Opaque banks, price discovery, and financial 
instability. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(3), pp.383–408. 
Jones, J.S., Lee, W.Y. and Yeager, T.J., 2013. Valuation and systemic risk consequences of 
bank opacity. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(3), pp.693–706. 
Kan, S. and Gong, S., 2018. Does High Stock Return Synchronicity Indicate High or Low Price 
Informativeness? Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment. International Review of 
Finance, 18(4), pp.523–546. 
Kelly, P.J., 2014. Information Efficiency and Firm-Specific Return Variation. The Quarterly 
Journal of Finance, 04(04). 
Kyle, A.S., 1985. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica. 
Lee, D.S. and Lemieux, T., 2010. Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 48, pp.281–355. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B.Y. and Yu, W., 2000. The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do 
Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58(1–2), pp.215–260. 
Morgan, D.P., 2002. Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opque industry. American 
Economic Review, 92(4), pp.874–888. 
Morgan, D.P. and Stiroh, K.J., 2001. Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 20(2–3), pp.195–208. 
Roll, R., 1988. R^2. The Journal of Finance, 43(3), pp.541–566. 
Sarkisyan, A., Casu, B., Clare, A. and Thomas, S., 2009. Securitization and Bank Performance. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 8(45), pp.1617–1658. 
Stiroh, K.J. and Rumble, A., 2006. The dark side of diversification: The case of US financial 
holding companies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30(8), pp.2131–2161. 
The Congress, 2014. Public Law 113–250. [ebook] pp.1-2. Available at: 
<https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ250/PLAW-113publ250.pdf> [Accessed 13 
June 2020]. 
The Federal Reserve, 2006. Federal Register. [ebook] pp.9897-9903. Available at: 
<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2006/02/28/06-1837/capital-adequacy-
guidelines-for-bank-holding-companies-small-bank-holding-company-policy-statement> 
[Accessed 13 June 2020]. 
12 
 
The Federal Reserve, 2015. Federal Register. [ebook] pp.20153-20158. Available at: 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-04-15/pdf/2015-08513.pdf> 
[Accessed 13 June 2020]. 
The Federal Reserve, 2018. Federal Register. [ebook] pp.44195-44199. Available at: 
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/2018-18756.pdf> 
[Accessed 13 June 2020]. 
Thomas, S., 2002. Firm diversification and asymmetric information: Evidence from analysts’ 
forecasts and earnings announcements. Journal of Financial Economics, 64(3), pp.373–
396. 
Watanabe, O. V., Imhof, M.J. and Tartaroglu, S., 2019. Transparency Regulation and Stock 
Price Informativeness: Evidence from the European Union’s Transparency Directive. 
Journal of International Accounting Research, 18(2), pp.89–113. 
Xing, X. and Anderson, R., 2011. Stock price synchronicity and public firm-specific 





Figure 1: Discontinuity in average synchronicity over 2015:Q3-2016:Q4 
 
 
Note: The figure corresponds to the baseline RD Design regression based on equation (1). The dependent 
variable is the average synchronicity over 2015:Q3-2016:Q2. The running variable is the total assets of BHCs in 
2014:Q2 with an asset threshold of $1 billion. For each side of the threshold, fourth-order polynomials of the 
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Table 1: Variables description and sample statistics: 2009-2018 (Annual) 
Panel A: Description of variables 
Variables Description 
SYN Stock return synchronicity, a measure of stock price informativeness estimated from the 
market model. 
Illiq The illiquidity ratio of Amihud (2002) 
ROA The return on assets. 
LnAsset The logarithm of the book value of bank asset. 
LoanToAsset The ratio of bank loans to total assets. 
EquityRatio The ratio of equity to total assets. 
MTB The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
NPL Non-performing loans scaled by total loans. 
 
Panel B: Sample statistics: 2014:Q3-2016:Q2 (Quarterly) 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
SYN 2,971 -3.99  -3.71  2.32  -11.76  0.48  
Illiq 2,971 0.02 0.01  0.07 0.00  0.88  
       
ROA 2,971 0.79  0.83  0.50  -2.50  2.23  
Asset (billion dollars) 2,971 1.01  0.97  3.23  0.16  2.00  
LoanToAsset 2,971 0.69  0.70  0.11  0.27  0.88  
EquityRatio 2,971 0.11  0.10  0.03  0.05  0.21  
MTB 2,971 1.18  1.05  0.35  0.30  2.64  
NPL 2,971 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.15  
 
 
Table 2: Pairwise correlations matrix for all explanatory variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  (1) LnAsset 1.000  
(2) ROA -0.010 1.000 
  (3) LoanToAsset -0.000 0.016 1.000 
  (4) EquityRatio 0.000 0.192* -0.001 1.000 
  (5) MTB -0.000 0.175 0.091 -0.164 1.000 
  (6) NPL -0.000 -0.207* -0.131 0.077 -0.274* 1.000 
Note: * significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression discontinuity of the Small BHC Policy Statement on stock return synchronicity 
  (1) （2） （3） (4) （5） (6) （7） （8） 
Dependent variable Synchronicity (SYN) 
 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) 
Quarter 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2 
Below-asset-threshold indicator (in 2014Q2) 0.0882 -1.466 -2.071 0.341 -2.816* -2.235** 1.076 1.085 
 
(2.711) (1.477) (1.301) (0.986) (1.663) (1.002) (0.917) (1.417) 
         
BHCs 133 126 134 133 130 120 118 126 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2014Q2 with a threshold of $1 
billion. The sample includes firms with total assets in 2014Q2 below and above the cut-off (i.e. below $2 billion). Controls for first order polynomials of the running 





Table 4: Regression discontinuity of the Small BHC Policy Statement on stock illiquidity 
  (1) （2） （3） (4) （5） (6) （7） （8） 
Dependent variable Illiquidity (Illiq) 
 
Before (pre-policy) After (post-policy) 
Quarter 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2 
Below-asset-threshold indicator (in 2014Q2) -0.013*** 0.005 0.010 0.0033 -0.011** -0.011* -0.016** -0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) 
         
BHCs 133 126 134 133 130 120 118 126 
Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. OLS estimates based on the RD Design. The running variable is total assets in 2014Q2 with a threshold of $1 
billion. The sample includes firms with total assets in 2014Q2 below and above the cut-off (i.e. below $2 billion). Controls for first order polynomials of the running 
variable separately for each side of the threshold are included. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
 
 
